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ACCOMMODATION PAPER
(Concluded)
Payment by the Accommodated Party
To the extent to which the accommodated party
pays the holder, the accommodation acceptor of a bill
or maker of a note, is discharged, "else", says Woodward, J., "part of the debt would be collected "twice;"
if 20 per cent have been paid by the endorser only the
renmining 80 per cent can be collected from the accommodation maker."
Giving Judgment by Principal Debtor
The accommodation endorser is not discharged by
the maker's confession of judgment to the holder for
the amount of the note, if the note is not surrendered,
and there is no understanding that the judgment should
be considered as payment of it.'
Securities For the Debt
Securities n%,y have been given to the holder of a
note, by the real debtor. The accommodation maker or
acceptor cannot insist that the holder shall avail him'_Love v. Brown, 88 Pa. 307.
ASafe Deposit Co. Y. -raig, 155 Pa. 343.
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self of them, before suing hinL A failure by the holder to preserve the security given by the real debtor, will
not discharge the accommodation maker e. g. failure to
record a mortgage, whereby a later mortgage is preferred."
The maker, "being the principal debtor," says
Kennedy, J., "would not have been entitled to the benefit of the mortgage, as she would certainly have been,
had she been a mere surety, and as such, had paid the
debt." An execution for the debt, is levied on the goods
of the accommodated party. The subsequent release of
the goods and stay of the execution, do not prevent compelling the accommodation maker to pay the note. "Indulgence to the payee, Who endorsed the note will not
prejudice the holder, as respects the gratuitous ,maker.""
Endorser a Surety For The Accommodation Maker
The principle underlying the decisions just cited,
is that the maker of a note, is the principal debtor, and
the endorser, even if he be the accommodated party, is
but -asurety. While a surety is discharged, if time is
given to the principal, or securities given by the principal are released; time gives to the surety; release of securities given by the surety, will not discharge the principal; If the payee (and endorser) the accommodated
'*Lord v. Ocean Bank, 20 Fa 384; Diffenbacker's Estate, 31
Super. 85; Geddis v. Hawk, 1 W. 280,
"Lewis v. Henchman, 2 Pa. 416; C. Deposit Co. v. Craig,
155 Pa. 43.
-tStevens v. Nat. Bank, 88 Pa. 167. If after A becomes accommodation maker for B of a note payable to X, B deposits
securities with the creditor X, B making no specific appropriation
of them to this note, X may appropriate them to other debts
than thfs note. A cannot insist that they shall be applied to the
note, Savings Fund Co. v. Hart, 217 Pa. 506.
"Yet In Smith's Appeal, 125 Pa. 404, the right of a maker
to securities given by the payee, was denied, because the maker
was not a gratuitous one for accommodation.
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party, makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors
before the maturity of the note, no dividend can be
awarded to the holder, for the reason that the holder
was not a creditor of the endorser when the assignment
was made; but was a creditor of the maker."
Right of Endorser With Respect to Securities
The accommodation endorser for the maker of a
note who has pledged securities for the payment of the
debt, has a right to have them applied to the debt, or
to be subrogated to them. If they have been improperly sold by the creditor, he may show that their value
exceeded the price obtained, and that a price obtainable
at a fair sale, would have produced enough to cover the
debt. If he does so, the action against him will be defeated.n The creditor should have called on the debtor
to pay the debt, tand, if he failed, have sold the security (certain stocks) and applied the proceeds to the
debt. If at the time vhen the endorsement for accommodation is made, the creditor agrees with the principal
debtor to surrender to the latter certain,securities, on -the
deposit of certain collaterals, thus inducing the endorser
tc assume the liabiity, and these collaterals are not deposited, he is not bound.' If securities are surrendred by the
creditor with the consent of the accommodator, whether
he be a maker or -an endorser, the surrender will be no
defence against the payment of the note." If the maker
of a note which A has endorsed for his accommodation,
has in the bank which holds the note, at its maturity
sufficient funds to pay it, the bank must apply the deposit to the note, in relief of the endorser
"Bank v. Strawbridge, 11 Haz. Pa. Reg. 237.
IlSitgreaves v- Bank, 49 Pa. 359.
RBaumgardner v. Reeves, 85 Pa. 250.
'O)eposit Co. v. Craig, 155 Pa. 348.
'Newbold v. Boon, 6 Super. 511.
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Pre-existing Debt
Art. 11, section 25 of the negotiable instruments
act,' defines value as "any consideration sufficient to
support a simple contract." It adds, "An antecedent or
pre-existing debt constitutes value, and is deemed such
whether the instrument is payable on demand or at a
Before this statute, the accepted docfuture time."
trine in Pennsylvania was, that a creditor who simply
received a note, as additional security for a debt, gave
no consideration for it and acquired no rights whiob
depend on the giving of a consideration. However it
was held that the maker of an accommodation note cannot set up the want of consideration as a defence against
it, in the hands of a third person, though such person
He
has received it simply as an additional security.
who chooses to put himself in the front (i. e. to become
maker of a note, or acceptor of a bill) for the benefit of
his friend, must abide the consequence, and has no
more right to complain, if his friend accommodate.%
himself by pledging it for an old delyt, than if ihe had
used it in any other way. * * Acconrmodation paper is
a loan of the maker's credit, without restriction as to
the manner of its use."' Usually the note made by A
for B's accommodation, is payable to B, and by him endoised to his creditor. But if B. the debtor induces
A to make a note payable to C, his creditor, C can enfree payment by A, although the indebtedness of B
continues, and no contract restraining the rights of the
creditor appears.'
SAct 1901; p. 199.

'Kirkpatrick v. Muirhead, 16 Pa. 123.
'Lord v. Ocean Bank, 20 Pa. 384; App1eton v. Donaldson. X
Pa. 381; Bank v. Todd, 132 Pa. 312; ITart v. Truq Co., 111 Pa.
,(5; Carpenter v. Bank, 106 Pa. 170; Twining v. Hunt, 7 W. N.
223.
'Savings Fund Co. v. Hart, 217 Pa. 506; Typesetting Co. v.
Ober, 36 Super. 291.
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No Consideration Given for the Accommodton
The case-just considered, of taking an accommodation note, bill, or endorsement, simply as an additional
security for a pre-existing debt, (and in which the courts
formerly refused to find a consideration) Is the only
case in which the gratuitous holder, not claiming
through a holder for consideration, can enforce the accommodation. When A gratuitously makes a note to B,
B cannot enforce it. If B in turn transfers gratuitously
to C, the supposititious right to receive the money from
A, C also cannot enforce A's promise.
Somewhere in
the line of transmission of a note, there must be some
one who has parted with value, in order to make the acconinodation enforceable.' If between B, the payee accommodated by the maker and his endorsee C, there is
a failure of consideration, C cannot enforce the note
against the maker.'
The Form of The Consideration
The consideration which some one must have given,
in order to make effective his accomtnodation against
the accommodator, may have any one of the innumerable
ehapes which are discussed in treatises on contracts.
While, until 1901, the mere existence of a debt, to the
taker, did not make him a holder for value, he became
such if he took it in partial or total payment of his
debt;' or if he bound himself to extend the-period of
'Peale v. Addicks, 174 Pa. 543. The plaintiff need not have
paid a consideration because he mnay have obtained the note from
one 'who did pay. Net. Bank v. Stadelman, 153 Pa- 634; Wilson
--. Savin.i Bank, 45 Pa. 488. If A makes a note payable to (G,
which C receives "n payment of a debt of B at whose request -A
makes it, 1G, is a holder for value, and can enforce the note;
Snyder v. Elliott; 2 Penny. 474.
Sechwarzkopf v. Hill, 2 Sadler 283.
'Struthers v. Kendall, 41 Pa. 214; Bardsley v. Delp, 88 Pa.
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credit. A clearing house association committee, takes
from a bank a note in settlement of its accounts. This
comnittee may enforce the payment of the note.'
A
member of the board of directors of a canal company,
for whose accommodation the note was made, may buy
it, and enforce it.' One purchases for value, a security
when he lends nmoney simultaneously with the transfer
to the .transferrer."
Consideration, As Respects Endorsement For Accommodation
Apparently there is no difference between an accommodation making and an endorsing, so far as the necessity that the holder or some one through whom he
claims, should have paid a consideration.
Taking as
collateral for a pre-existing debt is not taking for value;
but one who so takes the note, may enforce the endorsement. Says Sterrett, J., referring to certain cases,
"The doctrine of these and other cases is that an accommodation indorser of negotiable paper pledged by
the maker for an antecedent debt., cannot defend on the
ground that his endorsement was without consideration,
because that would defeat the purpose for which he
loaned his credit." A consideration and bona fides in
the acquisition of the note become necessary, to enable
the holder to enforce it, only when the endorsement
was fraudulently procured, or, instead of being an unrestricted loan of credit, it was made for a specific purpose, and without the endorser's consent, it was used
for an entirely different purpose." It was alleged by
the endorser that he had endorsed to enable the prior
TPhiller v. Patterson, 168 Pa. 468.
'Holmes v. Paul, 3 Gr. 299.
"Miller v. Pollock, 99 Pa. 202.
iCozens v. Middleton, 118 Pa. 622.

12Id.
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parties to the note, to obtain money on it,
with which to pay a debt to the endorser. It was instead transferred to X, a creditor of the prior parties.
X was found to have given a consideration, in that he
had given credit on an existing debt, for the amount
c_- the note. He could then enforce the endorsement."
When a note endorsed for accommodation, was delivered
in payment of an interest in a firm, to the vendor, B,
be was a bona fide holder for value and could compel
the endorser to pay. Where B, before the maturity of
the note, enodrsed it to X as collateral security for a
debt then contracted to X, X then became a holder for
value, and could enforce thenote, even if B had not
been able to enforce it."
Denials of Liability
While parol evidence is admissible to prove that a
note by A to B, endorsed to C, was made by A, for accommodation of B, it will not be received to show that
the agreement was that A should be liable to nobody,
under any circumstances. The averment in an affidavit of defence, "that the maker was not to be held liable
on the note, was" says Mitchell, J., "in flat contradiction
of the writing, and denied the only force the signature
to the note could have."' In an action by the maker
of a note, against X, for whose accommodation he alleges
that he made it, burden is on the plaintiff to prove the
allegation, but the court commits an error, (apparently)
when it says to the jury that the plaintiff's 'unsulported oath is not sufficient," an error .of which the defendants could not complain on appeal.' Oral evidence is
admissible though unnecessary that A, maker of a note
'Zi-ruthers v. Kendall, 41 Pa. 214.
"Miller v. Pollock, 99 Pa. 202.
Nat. Bank v. Stadelmya, 153 Pa. 634.
"Moore v. Phillips, 6 Super. 570.
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payable to B, was induced to execute it by B's promise
that -he should not be liable. "Between the parties to
an acconmodation note," says Smith, J., "an agreement
that the payee shall not call on the maker for payment
is wholly unnecessary, and it is unusual for the maker
to demand any assurance on this point. He need only
show the real character of the note, and the law relieves
hi.r from such obligation.'"'
A and B having jointly made a note, sued on by the
bank which had discounted it, A alleged that the cashier of the bank had said to B, at the time of discounting
and 'afterwards, that A's signing was a mere matter of
form to comply with the provisions of the national banking law. The action of the trial court in directing a
verdict against both makers. Elkin, J., recognizing that
the case fell within the rule that parol evidence is admissible to alter or contradict a writing, said that such
parol understandings must be established by evidence
that is clear, precise and indubitable. He failed to see
that such was the evidence in this case. The bank officer had said nothing to A before he signed. Statements by B, of assertions -by the officer, or of his understanding that A was assuming no liability, could not
exempt A from liability." A maker of a note for the
accommodation of another alleged as one defence, that
there was an understanding between him and the plaintiff, that he was not to be liable at all on the note, or,
if liable, only to the extent of certain collaterals pledged.
Brown, J., found "nothing in his testimony to show that
the company (plaintiff) or anyone authorized to speak
"Loucks v. Lightner, 11 Super. 499. In Clothier v. Sand Co.
21 Super. 886. Beaver, J., seems to intimate that to prove a
note to have been made for accommodation, two witnesses or
one witness with corroboration would be Tecessary.
"Ntat. Bank v. Long, 220 Pa. 556 The bank's officer's
authoi-ty to make any such statement was questioned.
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for it, ever said to him that his liability would in any
manner be different from that of the ordinary accommodation maker.""
Accommodation Endorser Has Rights of Endorser
In endorsing for accommodation, the endorser retains the right of an ordinary endorser. As the latter is
discharged by the failure of the holder to mke demand
at maturity upon the maker for paym.ent, and to give
notice to him, so is an endorser for accommodation.'
Accommodated Party Cannot Sue Accommodating
The party for whose accommodation X has made
a note or accepted a bill of exchange, or endorsed either
note or bill, cannot sue upon the accommodation." If
A makes a note for the accommodation of B and C, but
which is payable to B alone, B on paying it cannot reIf
cover from A,' nor could C sue A upon it."
it
upon
suit
C's
in
C,
to
payable
a
note
A and B make
got
he
that
showing
by
defend
ngainst both, B cannot
no consideration for ;his signature; since A may have
got it, on account of B's joint understanding."
Endorser For Accommodation Not Liable When Maker
Is Not
The holder of a note who is neither legally nor
equitably entitled to recover judgment against the
IiSavings Fund Co. v. Hart, 217 Pa. 506.

"Nat. Bank v. Nill, 213 Pa. 456.
"Hoffman v. Foster, 43 Pa. 137; mosser v. Criswell, 150 Pa.
409; Tasker's Appeal, 162 Pa. 122; Trust !Co. v. Hart, 217 pa.
606; Peal, v. Addicks, 174 Pa. 543.
"Mosser v. Cris%1ell, 150 Pa. 409.
'lothier

v. Sand Co., 21 Super. 386.

'4 hambers v. MCoean, 24 Super. 567. But the affidavit of

defense also alleged that B signed 16r the accommodation of C.

Why was tlht not enough?
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maker, cannot recover, says Trunkey, J., "against the
accommodation endorser."' The obstacle to a recovery
from the maker, (the real debtor) might be his having
paid the debt, or his having given securities to the
creditor, on account of the debt." The maker (principal debtor) having transferred to the creditor securities more than sufficient to pay the debt, and having
misapplied them, Woodward, C. J., said "Upon this theory
the debt is paid, and when a principal has paid is debt,
who shall deny to his surety or endorser the right to
show that it is paid. To shut out his defence and make
him pay the debt again with a chance to recover It in
an action against his principal, who in turn is to recover
it from the creditor, would be a circuity that neither
law nor common sense would tolerote." Possibly, if the
principal debtor, the maker, were entitled to damages
to the extent of the note from a bank, for the bank's
failure to return him vouchers, this would be a defence
to an action by the bank against the accommodation endorser."
Endorser For Accommodation Not Liable When Accommodated Party Would Not Be
If A,, owning a note and entitled, to collect the
money named in it, endorses it and delivers it gratuitously to X who, not becomning a party to it, delivers it
to Y, for a debt due from X to Y, whatever defences
X would have, as against an action for the debt by
Y, A will have against Y, when sued by Y on his endorsement. A is simply a surety for X. If X owes
$231.04 to Y, and the note is for $378.19, and Y on
34Cake v. Nat. Bank, 6 W. N. 88.
1
Sitgreaves v. Bank, 49 Pa. 359.
"Cae v. Bank, 6 W. N. 88. The defence was not valid for
the maker, and not the endorser.
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receiving the note from X agrees to pay the difference
to X, and he fails to do so, A, when sued on his endorsement, may defend to the extent to which Y has
failed to pay the difference."
Acc knmoklating Party Not Liable To Aecommodated.
The person accommodated cannot recover from the
accommodating party, whatever his position on the
note. A makes a note, payable to B, for the accommodation of B and C. C, apparently an endorsee of B,
cannot recover from A. The fact that B and C jointly promised to save A "harmless from loss in the
transaction," precludes C's mintaining suit against
A."
Denial That The Signature Induced Credit
If A makes a note payable to B, for B's accomodation, and B obtains money from C to whom he transfers the note, the right of C to enforce payment from
A will not depend on any speculation as to the relative detern-inativeness of A's signature and of B's.
A's affidavit of defense that C gave credit solely to B,
will not prevent judgment against him.'
Purchase at a Discount-What Recoverable
If A's note to B, is for B's accommodation, and
B endorses it for less than its face, to C, C may recover
the amount named in the note. E. g. note for $371.46. C,
who paid for it $348, only, could recover $371.46.' A,
for accommodation of B, nade to him a note for $2000.
"Gunnis v. Weigley, 114 Pa. 191.
"Olothier v. Send Co., 21 Super. 86.
'Lestherman v. VanDusen, 9 Sadler 305.
WMoore v. Beard, 30 Pa. 138. C bought without kno-ledgp
that it was an aceomnaodation note.
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B, through his broker, sold the note to C for $1820,
a discount of one and a half per cent a month, from
the face of the note. C sold the note to D, for the
same sun D having no knowledge that the note was
one for accommodation.
D was a purchaser of the
note, not a lender on it, and could recover from A the
$2000.' A note for $2000 made by A, .payable to B,
was endorsed by B, for accommodation, to C, who endorsed it to D, in payment of a judgment of $1,000;
held by D against C, and of a book account, the balance
being paid in cash. It was assumed by the trial court
that D could recover only so much as he had paid, in
judgment, book account and cash, that is, if C could
himself not have enforced the note, -he imparted to D
the right to enforce it, only to the extent of D's payment for it.'
Proof That Holder Is Bona Fide anud For Value
A holder of a bill or note is presumed, in the firsL
instance, to be bona fide and for value. This presumption is not overcome, the duty of proving that he acquired the instrument for value and bona fide, is not
put on the holder, by the proof that the acceptance or
making was for accommodation or that that it was was
known, to the holder whenhe becamesuch.' Butproofthat
the instrument was obtained by fraud, felony, or force,
or that it was lost will transfer the burden to the holder
of showing that he bought for value and in ignorance
of the fraud, etc.'If the payee of a draft accepted for
his accommodation violates the agreement as to the
use to -be nmade of it, this is not a fraud in the issue of
iGaul v.Willis, 26 Pa. 259.
4 amlock v. Welf, 179 Pa. &W.
'Gray v. Bank 29 Ps $65.
29 Pa. M.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

77

the draft, and does not put on the holder, (or the holder
&fa later draft-given in part payment of it) the proof that
he is a bona fide purchaser for value.'
Knowledge That The Instrument Is For Accomuodation
The knowledge by one who obtains a note, made
or endorsed for acconinodation, that it is such, is no
obstacle to the enforcenent of it. He can enforce it,
even when he receives it simply as additional security
for a pre-existing debt, and therefore, as was held
in Pennsylvania, prior to the Negotiable Instrument
Act, without consideration.'

'Bank v. Fitler, 155 Pa. 210.
Lord v. Ocean Bank, 20 Pa. 384; Moore v. Baird, 30 Pa.
138; Miller v. Pollock, 99 Pa. 206; Philler v. Patterson, 168 Pa.
468; Trust Co. v. Stetson, 175 Pa. 160; Cozens v. Middleton, ,18

Pa. M; Nat. Bank v. Stadebnan, 153 Pa. 634; Nat. Bank Y.
Dick, 22 Supir. 445.
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MOOT COURT
CARRIGAN vs. TFMPLE
Trespass for Negligence--Negligence in Leaving Plaintiff's House
Unlocked as Remote or Proximate Cause of a Resulting
Theft-Conditional Sale-Right to Retake Property for
Breach of Sale--Evidence--Competency of Divorced Wife.
•STAEMENT OF FACTS.
Temple ,broke open Carrigan's house to remove a sewing machine which he had conditionally sold, the condition having been
broken. He left the house open in Carrigan's absence and a thief
entered and took certain furniture from it. This is trespass to
recover damages, the value of the furniture thus taken. Defendant called the divorcd wife of Carrigan to testify that the furniture claimed for by him, was not in the house, while she was an
occupant of it, as wife. The court admitted the evidence. Verdict
for defendant. Appeal.
Eppley for Plaintiff.
Perry for Defendant.
OPINION OF COURT
HANDLR, J.-The contentions of the counsel for the parties to this suit bring into question the following points:
1. Did Temple pursue the correct legal method for obtaining
the machine whicn he had conditionally sold, the condition having been broken?
2. Was the theft of the furniture alleged to 'have been
stolen, the natural and -proximate consequence of defendant's
act?
s. Was the divorced wife of Carrigan a competent witness?
4. Was the testimony of the divorced wife relevant and
material?
. Did the court err in admitting the evidence of Carrigan's
divorced wife?
In the event of a default on the part of -the buyer under a
contract of conditional sale, the seller has the right of possesalon of the propelty and may retake the same. 165 Pa. 150, 16
Super. 474. There is no doubt that Temple had the right to re:
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take his goods upon the breach of condition and this he may exercise without recourse to the courts, by retaking possession,
provided he can do so "peacably." 14 Ind. 459, 16 Sup. 474, 17
Atl. 638. By the term ',peacably,"
we take it to mean "with
the consent of the buyer or lessee of the goods," for without the
latter's consent, the parties -to the transaction are apt to fail to
come to an agreement and thereby pave the way for an assault
cr breach of the peace. As was said in Van Wren vs. Flynn, 34
La. An. 1138, "the right to retake property does not confer on
the sel'er the right to enter the buyer's house in his absence
without his consent, and without notice and taes away the
property." Temple had no right to enter Carrigan's house during
the latter's absence and his act in doing so constituted a clear
case of trespass.
Next we come to the question whether or not the theft of
the furniture was the natural and proximate causer of Temple's
trespass ?
The general rule in actions for -torts is that the wrongdoer
is liable for all injuries resulting directly from the wrongful act,
whether they could or could not have been foreseen by him, prov*ded they are the legal and natural consequences of the wrongful act imputed to the defendant and are such as according to
common experience and the usual course of -events might reasonably have been anticipated. 20 C al. 156, 11 Ind. 522, 30 Hun
(N. Y.) W77. Sterrett, J. in 93 Pa. 492, says: "In deternining
what is proximate cause, the true rule is, that the injury must be
the natural and probable consequence, such a consequence as, under the surrounding circumstances of the case might and ought to
have been forseen by the wrong doer as likely to flow from his
act." Now, was Temple's act in leaving openCarrigan's house,
such an act from which he could readily have inferred that some
one would enter and do damage? Temple found the house closed
whenhe came there; why should he not have at least left itinthe
condition in which he found it? It 'is thecommon knowledge of ordinary men that bars and locks have proved trustworthy safeguards against the violation of homes. Such knowledge, if Temple
did not possess, the law will impute to him as having and for
leaving open Carrigans house, he became liable for the results
which he should have foreseen. Theft of goods from, a house,
easily accessible by thieves, should be contemplated by all who
leave their houses open. That is the reason why people lock up
their houses and that, no doubt, was one of the reasons for Carrigan so doing. Temple should clearly have foreseen what would
follow by his leaving open the house and for his failure to

80
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pro-4de 2gauhst this -he should be held liable for the damage
which followed as the natural consequence of his act.
The Act of May 23, 1887, enacts "Nor shall either husband or
wife be competent or permitted to testify to confidential communications made by one to the other unless this privilege be waived upon trial."
And when the marriage relation 'has been terminated by a
divorce, the former husband (wife) is a competent witness
against his former wife (husband) to testify to matters as to
which his knowledge was not acquired 'by confidential communications during the marital intercourse. 117 Pa. 283. And
again in Brock vs. -Brock, 116 Pa. 109, the court said: "the privileged character of confidential communications between 'husband
and wife during marriage does not cease with the termination
of the marriage relation by divorce." The law, threfore, still is
that a divorced wife may testify against her former husband except as ,to matters which came to her knowledge by means of confidential communications. The question then arises, when is a
communication confidential? 'IWhether a communcation between
husband and wife is confidential or not," says Fell, J. in Seitz vs.
S96tz, 170 Pa. 71, "depends upon its character as well as upon
the relation of the parties. It is essential that it should be made
in confidence and with the intention that it should not be divulged.
If not made because of the relation of the parties and in the
crnfidence which that relation inspires and which it is the policy
of the law to hold inviolate, it is not privileged," The matter to
which Carrigan's divorced wife testified was one which was by no
means to be kept secret or which was -ever contemplated to be
kept secret, for biow could 'it? The amount of furniture which
one posesses in his house is subject to being seen- by all those,
who, perchance, may cross it threshold, and the huband and wife
could therefore never have intended that such knowledge be
kept secret. Besides conversations and transactions between husband and wife and a third person (in this ease with defendant)
are not privileged, as the presence of the third person shows that
they have not taken place in the confidence of the marriage relation. 'Robb's Appeal, 98 Pa. 501, Durnback vs. Bishop, 183 Pa.
602. It can plainly be seen that Carrigan's divorced wife was
therefore a competent witness and the matter to which she testified was not of such a confidential nature as to be excluded.
Lastly we come to consider the relevancy and materiality of
the testimony of the divorced wife. She testfiies that the alleged
stolen furniture was not in the house at the time she was his
wife. True as this may be, is it material to decide the
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case? Is it, whether the furniture which was in the house at the
time she was the wife, or the furniture which was there at the
time the theft was committed, that is material? The wife had
become divorced; the furniture which was in the house while she
was wife may not have been there at the time of the theft. We
do not see how testimony as to the former will help the jury to
arrive at a proper and just conclusion as to the latter.
Evidence must relate to and be connected with the transact'on it is offered to elucidate and this connection must be immediate and not remote or far fetched. How can the evidence
of the Wife "that the furniture was not in the house at the time
she was wife," be said to be immediate to the question in controversy-namely, "Was the furn'ture, alle.red to have been
stolen, in the house at the time of the theft?" We are of the
op~nion that it is not; tha" the eviden!e of the divorced wife is
not material to the point in controversy; that her evidence
should have been excluded and that the court erred in admitting
her testimony.
Judgment reversed and a new trial awarded.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
It is unnecessary to inquire whether the defendant had a
right to enter the plaintiff's house as he did. He is not sued
for the entry, but for the mode of his exit. He is sued, because
on leaving the house, he did not securely close it, and because in
consequence a theft of valuable furniture has occurred.
.What furniture was stolen, becomes a question. A divorced
wife can testify for or against her former husband, except that
she cannot testify to what she has learned by his confidential
disclosures.
The learned court below has decided, and properly, that the
knowledge of the contents of the house cannot be said, generally,
to be derived through a husband's communications. They can be
seen by anybody, 'by visitors, by servants, by the children of
the family. No reason for the husband's desiring to keep concealed the presence or absence of the furniture is apparent. The divorced wife was not incompetent to testify, Stewart vs. North
Co., 65 Super. 195.
The vwfe testifies that thefurniture forwhoseltheft-the actionis
brought, was not in the house while she was an occupant of it. It
is suggested that that might well be, and still, the furniture
might have been in the house at the time of the alleged theft.
But, it does not appear that the theft, said to have occurred,
occurred afer the divorce, and after the wife had left the house.
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In the appellate court it must appear that the evidence was improperly received to justify reversal because of having admitted it. We must not be astute to convict the trial court of .eror,
The learned court below considers the question whether the
theft of the furniture was a -probable effect of leaving the house
unlocked, for which the defendant should be liable. It seems to
be so considered, in Stewart vs. North Co., 65 Sup. 195. The defendant's act did not cause the theft, but caused the facility with
which it could .be done. In Nirdlinger vs. Tel. Co., 245 Pa. 453,
Mewart, J. refused to find a causal bond between a negligence
which made possible or 'practidable a burglary and the burglary.
Yet we are not convinced that the conclusions of' the learned
court upon this point is error.
The trial court has made no error, and the judgment of reversal must 'be
Reversed.
LENNOX'S ESTATE
Will-Vested or Contingent Legacies-Gift to a Person "as" He
Shall Reach a Certain Age.
STATEMIENT OF FLACJTS
Lennox left a will in which he gave a farm and $4,000 to his
nephew Henry, who was then 18 years old, "as he shall reaech
the age of 21 years." Henry died when he was 20 years and 360
days old. His administrator claims the $4,000 from the estate.
.Morehead for Plaintiff.
Handler for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
KEIJOHNER, J.-The testator left a will in whioh he gave
a farm and $4,000 to his nephew Henry, who at his death, was
18 years old, as he shall reach the age of 21 years. Henry died
before he arrived at the age of 21 years. The question is now
presented whether the legacy bequeathed on that contingency,
vested at the death of the testator?
The general ruie is that a legacy will 'be held to be vested
or contingent as the time shall be annexed to the gift, or only
to the payment of it.
There is nothing in the said will designating a distinction
between the gift and direction as to payment. The testator's intention is expressed with the words, "I give * * * * * as he shall
reach the age of 21 years." In Hawkins on wills, second edition,
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page 225. "A bequest to A at 21 and a bequest to A payable at
21 do not much differ in expression. Yet one is vested, the other
a contingent gift; for it is a rule of construction that in bequests of personal estate, if the gift and direction as to payment
are distinct, the direction as to the time of payment does not
,postpone the vesting. Thus, a bequest to A, payable at 21, or
to be paid at 21, is vested; and if A dies under .21 his representatives will be entitled. But, a bequest to A as he shall attain
a given age is prima facia contingent.
Reference has been
made by both counsel to cases wherein English cases have been
cited.
After careful examination of the early English cases the
law as stated is: In 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. if money is bequeathed to
one at his age of 21 years and he dies before that age the
money is lost.
The rule and distinction in these cases is agreeable to the
evil law, which -is that if a legeacy be devised to one generally, to be paid or payable at the age of 21, or any other age,
and the legatee dies before that age; yet this is such an interest
vested in the legatee that his excutor or administrator may sue
for and recover it; the time beng annexed to the payment and
not to the legacy itself; so if the legacy is made to carry interest, though the words to be paid or payable are omitted, it
shall be an interest vested. But if the legacy be devised to one
at 21, or if, or when -he shall attain the age of 21, and the
legatee dies before that age, the legacy is lapsed. In 3 Bro. C. C.
472, the testator gave by his will as follows: I give to my
daughters, the sum of * * * * * , when they shall arrive at 24
years of age. Upon the part of the plaintiffs, it has been contended, that this legacy must be considered as vesting, in
praesenti and the period of 24 years annexed to it, is not a
condition but the time When the party should be put 'into complete possession. All the, cases establish this
principle, that
where the time is mentioned as referring to the legacy itself,
unless it appears to 1ave been fixed by the testator as absolutely necessary to have arrived before any part of his bounty
can attach to the legatee, the legacy attaches immediately, and
the time of payment is merely postponed, not being annexed
to the substance of the gift. .But if it appears that the testator
intended it, as a condition precedent upon which the legacy must
take place, then if such condition or contingency does not happen, the gift never arises.
It has therefore been insisted by the defendant's counsel,
that the word, as, must be considered as denoting a condition
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annexed, and therefore in such a case the legacy cannot take
place.
It seems to have been the English law that if money was
bequeathed with inetrest payable until the legatee reached a
certain designated age then .the legacy was vested.
Where the gift seems ent:rely dependent on the attainment
by the beneficiary of the required age it is contingent.
The learned counsel for the plaintiff has cited, -Smith's Estate, 226 Pa. 304 in support of his contention that this is a
vested legacy. The court held that when the legacy is not given
until a certain future time it does not vest until that time, and
if the legatee dies efore, it is lost
In many cases following the rule in England, our supreme
court has held that where there is no separate and antecedent
gift which is indepedent of direction and time of payment; the
legacy is contingent and it seems to be as well founded in reason as rules of interpretation usually are. Where a gift is only
roma direction -to pay, it is n ecssarlly inseparable
imp..ed
from the dirac.-on, and must partake of ts quality, in so much
tiiat .f the one is future and contingent so must the other be.
In 'Smith's Estate, 1226 Pa. 304, it was said as Chief Justice
Tilghman said in Patterson vs. iawthorne, 12 iS. & R. 112. "The
rule is that where a legacy is given to a person to be paid at a
Ature time it vests Immediately. -But when it is not given until a certain future time and if the legatee dies before, it is lost.
The statement of the rule by Chief Justice Gibson, in Moore
v.o. Smith, 9 Watts403, repeated in 250 Pa. 171; 254 Pa. 147;
in 257 Pa. 334 and in 260 Pa. 388; has always been accepted, it
is: The legacy shall be deemed vested or contingent just as the
time shall appear to have been annexed to the gift or the payment of it. In the case at bar the time is manifestly annexed to
the gift, not merely to its payment. The beneficiary having died
bEfore the time fixed for giving, he gets no hing. Judgment is
entere dfor the defendant.
OXPIiNON OF THE SUPREME 'COURT,
The gift to Henry was "as he shall reach the age of 21
years." He died when he was 20 years and 360 days old. If the
gift was contingent upon his Teaching the age of 21 years, it
has been annulled by his death before that time.
There is no gift here, with a postponement of the time bf
payment. ISmith on Executory Interests states that when Teal
or personal estate is devised or -bequeathed to a person, when
or as soon as he shall attain a certain age * * * * * and there
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are no other words indicative of an intent to confer a vested
interest, and nothing in the form -of the limitation on itself to indicate an intent merely to delay the possession or enjoyment
"the interest of the donee or legatee will be contingent until he
attain the age specified." Quoted by Brown, J., Grothe's Estate,
237 Pa. 262. The bequest to Henry is "as" he reaches 21 years of
age. One of the meanings of "as" is when, and this is its sense
here. In the case cited, the bequest was of $1,000 to each of
several persons; "to each as they became 25 years of age." It
was held that the gift was contingent until the legatees reached that age. With the death of one of the legatees when he was
but 17 years old "the contingent legacy ceased to exist."
The learned court below has so well vindicated his conclusion, that further remarks 'by us would be superfluous.
Appeal dismissed.
LIVINGSTON vs. RAILROAD CO.
Trespass for Personal Injuries--Constitutional
Servant Doctrine-Negligence.

Law-Fellow

STATEMEN T OF FACTS.
An act of the legislature made railroad companies and
other employers in hazardous business liable for the injuries
to employes not caused by their negligence (i. e., that of employes). Livingston in coupling cars was seriously mangled and
permanently hurt. The court rejected evidence that a fellow employe's negligence caused the accident. There was no evidence of
neglect by the defendent. The act imposing the liability was attacked as violating the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution
of the United States.
•Myers for Plaintiff.
Sharman for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
HERING, J.-The error assigned is the rejection of the
evidence of the negligence of the fellow employe. It is very
true at common law that a master or employer is not responsible to those engaged in his employment for injuries suffered by
them as a result of the negligence or carelessness or misconduct of fellow servants of the same employer engaged in the
same common service or employment. 133 U. S. 375.
But the act of the legislature making railroad companies
and other employers in hazardous business liable for injuries to
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employes not caused by the injured employe's own negligence,
does away with the old common law defense.
Clearly at comomon law, evidence of the fellow employe's
negligence was admissible. Under the act, however, it is irrelevant and immaterial, as the fellow employe's negligence is
no longer a defense, provided of course 'the act is constitutional.
This case therefore turns on the constitutionality of the act. It
is contended by the plaintiff in error that the act is in violation
of the Constitution of the United States.
The fourteenth amendment provides: "No state shall make
or enforce any law which abridges the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States. Nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." It is contended that the act of legislature
deprives persons of property and liberty without "due process
of law." As far as property is concerned, we find in 255 Pa. 33
that no one has property in any rule of common law. Rights of
property may be acquired under it, and when so acquired, the
owner of them is not to be deprived of them "unless by the law
of the land," but while the rights of property created by the
unwritten iaw cannot be taken away without due process of
law, the common law "tself may be changed by statute, and is
changed, and operates in future only as changed. "The common
law expresses the policy of the state for the time being only, and
is subject to change by the power -that adopted it." Western
Union Telegraph Co. vs. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U. S. 406.
In Mondon vs. N. Y. N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 223 U. S. 1 it was
held that a person has no property, no vested interest, in any
rule of common law. The great office of statutes is to remedy
defects in the common law as they are developed and to adapt
it to changes of time and circumstances. Young vs. Duncan, 216
Mass. 346, and numerous other cases.
The statute does not deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. It has placed employes In
hazardous businesses in a special classification. The protection
given by law is to be deened equal if all persons in the same
class are to be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both as to privilege conferred and liability imposed. 'Legislation which is carryng out a public 'purpose is limited in its
application is not within the prohibition of the fourteenth
amendment if within the sphere of its operations it affects alike
all persons similarly situated." Jones vs. iBrim, 165 U. S. 180.
It is urged by the plaintiff in error that the act is an unrea-
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sonable interference with the right of an individual to contract,
and therefore affects or abridges the privileges and immunities
of a citizen. The only abridgement of contract expressed or implied in the act is the absence of the right of an employer to
make a contract limiting or releasing damages for future negligence of a fellow employe. In Penna R. R. vs. Butler, 57 Pa.
335; 114 Pa. -523, and in Penna. R. R. vs. Baiorden, 119 Pa. 577,
we find that a contract limiting or releasing damages for future
negligence is against public policy.
The attorney for the plaintiff in error has taken the task
upon himself of upholding the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act of 191-5,, which involves a
broader defense than the act in question. This MWorkmen's Compensation Act, Section 201 (a) of which is identical with the
act in question, was declared to be constitutional in Anderson
vs. Carnegie Steel 'Co., 255 Pa. 33.
In view of the above facts, the assignment of error is overruled and the judgment is affirmed.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME 'COURT.
Holding a man liable for injuries which he did not personally inflict, is not unknown to the- common law. A principal is
held answereable for the acts of an agent, often when the agent
has exceeded his authority. The law then, 'has never committeh
itself to the principle that a man shall be liable only for such
injuries to others as he himself has caused or sanctioned.
Until recently, it has been recognized that when an employe
was injured by the negligent act of a fellow employe, he could
not obtain redress from the employer, unless in the employment or the retention in his service of the negligent servant, he
was himself negligent, or unless he directed the negligent act
to be done.
But, that the law has been so, is not a very impressive argument that it shall continue so. The existing law has been made
by courts or legislatures. Why, then, may it not be changed by
the same authority? We have a dual legislative power in the
Anglo-American jurisdictions, that of the judges, and that of the
general assemblies or parliaments. While the courts do not
professedly repeal parliamentary law, it is eminently the function of parliaments to repeal or alter the judge-made law.
In recent years it has been felt that when, in the prosecution
of a business, harm happens to a worker, it is not fair that he
should bear it alone, or be content with such redress as the fellow employe who caused it, could afford. Such emplyoe is usual-
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ly a man of very limited pecuniary capacity. Why, then, should
not the indemnification for the loss or injury be made a charge
on the business? Or, as the business is the property of the employer, on him? This conception has lately taken possession of
the thoughts of legislators, and both in national and in state,
in American and in British legislation, it has found expression.
Despite the form of action that may be adopted, one sounding in tort, it is not necessary to conceive of the employer as a
tort-feasor. ,He is simply operating a business, to which accidents, arising from defects of machinery, from imperfect memory, skill, attention of fellow-workingmen are incident, and the
business it is conceived should be compelled to furnish to the innocent sufferer an indemnity.
The state can properly say that men engaged in businesq
shall prosecute it only on condition that the business shall make
compensation to the human agents engaged in it who suffer
injury while so employed.
The defendant thinks he is deprived by the statute of his
property without due process of law, in defiance of the fourteenth amendment. He does not, as we suppose, intend to say
that he has property in any principle of
the common law.
Rather, he asserts that to compel him to pay $1,000, or $2,000,
or $5,000 to his workman for a harm. which he did not produce
is by so much to deprive him of his property, and that such a
deprivation is without due process. The learned court below,
however, has too well discussed the constitutionality of such
legislation to make any observations thereupon by us, necessary. Anderson vs. Steel Co., 255 Pa. 33.
Affirmed.
FOWLER vs. LIFE INSURANCE CO.
Life Insurance-Waiver of Forfeiture--Promisory Note in Lieu
of Premium-LPartial Payment of Notes--Extension of Time
for Payment of Remainder of Note--Notice.
STATEMENT OF PACT.
Fowler obtained a policy for $5,000 on his life, his wife, the
plaintiff, being named the beneficiary. The annual premium payable was $200. Instead of insisting on payment in cash, sometimes the company accepted notes at 90 days for the payment
of the premiums. For that falling due on February 1, 1917, it
accepted a note. The note contained the statement that if not
paid at maturity the policy should be vold. This note was not
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paid when due, but payment of $25 was accepted, and the
company agreed to give 30 days for the payment of the remainder. That time elapsed without payment. Three months
af:er 'its expiration Fowler died. This is a suit upon the policy
by the widow. She contends: First, no notice had been given
that the policy had been forfeited; second, the acceptance of
partial payment and the extension of time were waiver of the
stipulation for forfeiture; third, it is inequitable to enforce forfeiture of $5,000 for default or less than $200.
McCready for -Plaintiff.
Kelchner for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
MYERS, J.--Whatever may be the necessity for notice of
the forfeiture of insurance policies for default of payment of
the premiums in other cases, this case certainly cannot be so
construed as to make such notice necessary. The note given and
accepted In lieu of the premium then due was a contract between the insurance company and the insured and as such is the
law of transaction. By express agreement of the parties liability
on the policy ceases upon the failure of the insured to pay the
note when due without any affirmative action on the part of the
insurance company. One surely is bound to know and to perform the terms and provisions of one's own contracts. If the contract should be disadvantageous to him he should have discovered that fact before agreeing to its provisions. The courts
cannot render him assistance, unless he can show fraud. The
opinion of the learned court in 56 Sup. 233 is based upon substantially these same principles.
It is contended for the plaintiff that the extension of the
time for the payment of the balance due upon the note upon part
payment of $25 is waiver of the forfeiture provision. To maintain this contention in the face of the -express provision for the
forfeiture of the policy on the failure to pay the note at maturity, it is necessary to show that it is the practice of the
company to extend the time of the premium notes at maturity
and to waive the right to forfeit the policy upon default of payment. There is no evidence tending to attribute to the company
such a line of previous conduct.
In the second place the extension of the time of the note at
maturity even upon part payment of the obligation of the note
is void as regards the insurance company for want of good and
valuable consideration. -Payment of part of a debt before it is
due is valuable consideration for -extension of time; but part
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payment of debt at maturity is not a valuable consideration for
an extension of time for the payment of the whole. In the
former case the debtor parts with his right to -have all the time
till maturity in which to pay the note and therefore he suffers
detriment. In the latter case the debtor parts with and the
creditor receives nothing more and even less than should be
paid, for the whole debt is due and failure to pay the whole
debt is detriment to the creditor and benefit to the debtor. Thus,
unless it can be shown to be the continued practice of the insiirance company to waive the right to have the policy forfeited
for non-payment of the premiums, no such waiver can be as
oumed here; and furthermore for lack of vauable consideration
the extension of time on the note at maturity when part payment of the debt has been accepted is void and unenforceable
against the insurance company and no waiver can arise by reason of such extension. We direct attention t othe opinion of the
court in 74 Pa. 40 for confirmation of these principles.
As to recovery on the -grounds of equity it may be said that
the courts do not favor forfeitures. But the courts cannot but enforce them when the party by whose default the forfeiture was
incurred cannot show good and stable ground in the conduct of
the other on which to base a reasonable excuse for the default.
It must be clear that the forfeiture was intended by the stipulations of the parties. In the case there can be no doubt that
such was the very evident intention of the statement in the
note providing for forfeiture.
Provisions for forfeiture are common to all insurance policies and the number of cases cited by the attorney for the defense shows conclusively that it is the policy of courts everywhere to recognize such provisions.
Judgment for the insurance company.
OPINION OF THE SUPRENfE COURT.
The annual premium was $200. It does not appear that the
policy stated that failure to pay an instalment when due should
forfeit the policy. The company at times accepted notes at 90
days for the premium. It did so for the premium of February 1,
1917. The note then accepted stated that if it was not paid at
maturity, the policy should be void. This note was not paid
when due. It was partially paid later and the company gave ;0
days for the payment of the remainder.
Although partial payment of a debt that is due is no cons'deration for a promise to give time, we think it ought to suspend the right to annul a policy, until the lapse of the extended
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time, without payment. The assured should not be bound to
know that a gratuitous -promise may be ignored, and that he
may be, if he acts on it, overtaken with the loss by forfeiture, of
a large claim. We see in the agreement, a waiver of the right
to forfeit, if payment should be made at the postponed period.
However, the waiver is conditional and temporary. The note
was not paid within the extended time, or ever. There was no
waiver of forfeiture, if the premium should not be paid within
that time.
Notice of the forfeiture was of no use to the assured. He
could not repeal it. The forfeiture could not be undone by anything that he could have done, had he known of it.
Waiving the right to forfeiture after one default is not
waiver of a forfeiture for any future default. Waiver may be
conditional as well as absolute. The waiver was on the condition that the balance of the premium of February 1, 1917,
should be paid at a certain time and it was not paid.
The company was not under a duty to pay $5,000, and that
amount was not lost by the non-payment of the February 1st
premium. It would have been lost by the non-payment of any
future premium, a tenth, twentieth, or thirtieth. The payment of
a possibly long series of premiums would be necessary to entitle
the beneficiary to receive the money. It is not inequitable to
conaition the continuance of the obligation of the policy, upon. the
punctual payment of the annually -recurring premiums, or to
enforce the condition.
The judgment of the learned court below is
Affirmed.
ANDERSON vs. JENKINS
Rjectmeykt-Resulting and Constructive Trusts-Act of June 4,
1901-Effect of Judgment Execution Against the Holder of
'the Legal Title when Declaration of Trust Unrecorded.
STATIMMNT OF FACTS.
At a sheriff's sale a lot was sold for $4,000 to X, who,
however, bought for Jenkins.
X by writing declared that he held the legal title in trust
for Jenkins. Before this declaration was put on record. Anderson obtained a judgment for $2,500 against X, and on
this judgment a sale of the lot took place to Anderson. This is
ejectment to obtain possession.
Weiss for Plaintiff.
Davies for Defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

ZAVOYtKI, J.-Prior to the Act of June 4, 1901, P. L.
425, a judgment was a lien only upon lands actually owned by
the defendant, and against it a secret or resulting trust and
unrecorded title could prevail. Still vs. Swackhammer, 103 Pa.
7.A judgment creditor was not entitled to the protection of a
purchaser of the legal title, against an equitable owner.
*While the recordingActs of May 25, 1878, P. L. 151 and
May 19, 1893, P. L. 108, protect subsequent innocent purchasers of mortgages of the owner of the legal title against
prior unrecorded deeds, mortgages or declarations of trusts, they
do not protect judgment creditors. For although in the Act of
1893 the words "any creditor of the grantor" appear, as it
-was pointed out in Davey vs. Ruffel, 162 Pa. 443, these words
are inoperative, as no method is provided by which creditors may
place themselves upon the records in advance of a prior unrecorded deed, mortgage or declaration of trust.
This was the situation when the Act of 1901 was passed,
which changed the existing law with respect to resulting trusts.
The first section of which is as follows: "Whenever hereafter
a resulting trust shall arise with respect to real property, by
reason -of the payment of the purchase money by one person,
and the taking or making of the legal title in the name of another, if the person advancing the purchase money has capacity
to contract, such resulting trust shall be void and of none effect
as to bona fide judgment or other creditors or mortgagees of the
-holder of the legal title, or purchasers from such holder, without notice, unless either (1) a declaration of trust in writinz
has been executed and acknowledged by the holder of the legal
title, and recorded in the recorder's office o the county where
the land is situated, or (2) unless an action of ejectnent has
been begun, in the proper county by the person advancing the
money against the holder of the legal title."
The manifest purpose of this act was to protect judgment or other cerditors lending money or extending credit to
another in good faith upon the strength of a clear recorded title
to the land in the debtor, against secret or unrecorded declarations
of trust or deeds by his debtor to another, of which he had no
knowledge. The effect of this act is, to discourage secret trus*
and conveyances and to facilitate business transactions by making the public records reliable.
In Rochester Trust Co. vs. White, 243 Pa. 469, it was expressly decided that the notice contemplated by the words
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"without notice" in the act, is actual notice and not constructive
notice, such as is given by the occupancy of the land by the
equitable owner or his tenant, on the ground that to decide
exotherwise would leave the mortgagees and purchasers In
actly the same situation as they were prior to the passage of
the act and therefore useless legislation, which we cannot impute to the Legislature.
If this view is correct and which we are compelled to acccpt notwithstanding the fact tha we might entertain a different view, we must hold that the act applies to all cases of resulting trust that arise by the payment of the pucrhase price
by one party and the taking of the title by another, except
where the judgment creditor, mortgagee or purchaser as the case
may be of the holder of the legal title had actual notice of the
trust, no matter how difficult it may be for the equitable owner to place himself in a position to be able to avail himself of
one of the two remedies provided by the act for his prtection.
Tne primary purpose of the two remedies is to place some
evidence of ownership by the equitable owner upon record, and
thus give notice thereof to the world, and not the recovery of
the possession of the land for that is merely incidental to ownership and will naturally follow upon the proof of ownership.
And so, although the primary purpose of an action of ejectment
is the recovery of land, the legislature might have intended
that an equitable owner in possession, unable to procure a
declaration of trust from the holder of the legal title, might
bring an action of ejectment under this act as under a feigned
issue, as a speedy method of placing evidence of the ownership
on record and not for the recovery of the land, for that he already has. But it is not necessary for us to decide whether or
rot an equitable owner under such circumstances could bring
an action of ejectment, for in the present case Jenkins had a
written declaration of trust and so he had means of preventing
the present embarrassing situation, but having failed to take
advantage of it, he has no one to blame, but himself, if he is
hurt.
',A bona fide judgment creditor is one who, in good faith
without fraud or collusion, recovers a judgment for money honestly due him." Rochester Trust Co. vs. White, 243 Pa. 496.
And so there is nothing in the facts of the case to show that
Anderson was not such a bona fide judgment creditor, we will
bold that he was such.
As the result of the above discussion we arrive at the conelusion, in which we are supported by Rochester Trust Co. vs.
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White, 243 Pa. 496, and Levy vs. Hershberger, 249 Pa. 504, that
the act of 191 applies to a case where the equitable owner
is in possession, and that the plaintiff is a bona fide judgment
creditor within the contemplation of the act, and inasmuch as
the defendant did not avail himself of the remedies provided for
his protection by the act, we therefore render judgment for the
plahntiff.
OPIMION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
The conveyance to X put in him the legal title, but the
equitable was in Jenkins. Prior to the Act of 1901, a judgment
against X would have bound nothing. A sale on it, however,
would have passed the apparent title of X as a fee free from
any equity, and anything else, if the records gave no notice of
Jenkins' equity. It does not directly appear that the sale
on
the judgment took place before the recording of X's declaration
of trust. If it did not, the purchaser had notice of the equity, and
could not hold the land free therefrom.
The Act of June 4, 1901, however, has made the lien of
the judgment upon a legal title, prevail against an unrecorded
equity and the purchaser under a judgment would hold the
land free from the equity because of the exemption from that
equity of the judgment creditor.
We do not know when Jenkins obtained possession of the
land. We cannot assume, then, that he was in possession when
the judgment was recovered, or when the sheriff's sale took
place. We are not concerned, then, with the question whether
possession was not notice to Anderson when he secured his
judgment or when he bought at the sale.
The case cited by the learned court below, Trust Co. vs.
White, 234 Pa. 496, holds that possession would not be notice.
The statutory modes of notice prescribed were wanting.
Though there was a declaration of trust by X it was not on
record, and no express notice of It is asserted, nor had Jenkins
brought an action of ejectment.
It follows then that the result reacned by the learned
trial court must be accepted as correct.
Affirmed.
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HYDE vs. SIMPSON.
Assumpsit--"Good and Marketable" Title-_Right of Purchaser
to Recover Money Paid on Contract to Sell Land with a,
Doubtful Title--urden of Proof of Title.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Simpson contracted to convey land to Hyde for $10,000 and
to furnish an abstract of title showing a good and marketable
title. Title in Simpsn was through a will, and whether under this
will Simpson had a fee, was disputable. If he had not such a
fee, some one else had. Hyde paid $2,000 at the time the
contract was made. Later, upon being advised by counsel that
Simpson's title was doubtful, Hyde then decided to rescind the
contract.
This is a suit to recover the $2,000 paid. He contends that
it is not necessary that he satisfy the court that the title held
by Simpson is bad. He admits that it may be good and he
thinks it is good, but says that it is not marketable, because of
its disputableness, and because of the consequent unwillingness
of others, were it offered for sale to take it and pay the price
which they would willingly pay if the title was clear of dubiousness.
'Lawton for Plaintiff.
Lehmeyer for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE (OURT.
KELLY, J.-This is an action of assumpsit to recover $2,000
which the plaintiff has paid on a contract to convey land and to
receive a good and marketable title. Since no time is specified in
the contract within which Simpson had to perform his part of
the agreement, it is presumed that a reasonable tine is meant,
and that time has elapsed.
We have not been able to find any cases in which the facts
are the same as in the case at bar, but numerous Penna. cases
hold that the vendor cannot recover the balance of the purchase
price of land, the ttle to which is in doubt. 67 Pa. 436; 153 Pa.
424; 44 Pa. 371; 168 Pa. 530; 10 Watts 413. This is the law because the courts want to protect the vendee from future litigation and to facilitate his parting with the title. If in the above
cases the vendor cannot recover the balance of the purchase
money, surely the vendee can get back what money he has already parted with.
As stated in one case "an action of assumpit for money
had and received is a remedy equitable in its nature, existing in
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favor of one person against another, when that other person
has received money under such circumstances that in equity and
good conscience he ought not to retain the same, and which belongs to P." 47 L. R. A. 767; 1 Atl. 256; 16 Sul,. 611; 11. Sup.
209. Assumpsit is the action here, and since the defendant took
the money in return for a promise which he cannot fulfill, the
Title
law must see that the plaintiff receives his money back.
claimed under a disputed will is not fixed for a long time after
the testator's death. Such a title is clearly one in which doubt
is found. If upon the termination of suits to determine the
owner of the fee in the present case, the fee is found to rest in
could bring
another person than- Simpson, that person
ejectment against Hyde and recover the land. Such occurrences
should be guarded against, for public policy demands that an
owner have a clear title in fee to his land. A marketable title
is defined as being one in which there is no doubt involved either
as to fact or law. Every title is doubtful which 'invites or exposes the party holdiig it to litigation. If there be a color of
title outstanding, which may prove substantial, a purchaser will
not be compelled to take it and encounter the hazard of litigation. 158 Pa. 424. The property in this case is clearly unmarketable for litigation might arise at any time after Hyde took the
legal title.
Defendant claims that Hyde must prove that his (Simpson's) title is bad. This is not thelaw. 3 L. R. A. 742. The burden of proof is upon Simpson, for it is much easier for the person claiming title to prove his title than it is for another to
show it is bad.
Since -Simpson had no legal title, that is a good and marketable title, and since in a contract in which the legal title
has passed the vendee can recover what he has paid when the
vendor 'has not passed a good and marketable title, we think
that in this case where as yet no legal title passed the plaintiff
can rescind the contract and recover the $2,000 paid. Judgment
for plaiantiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPEME COURT.
The title to be given to Hyde was not only good but marketable. It might h.ave the former attribute without having the
latter. In order to be marketable, it must be indubitably good
"for otherwise," says Sharwood, J., "the purchaser may be buying a lawsuit, which will be a very serious loss to him, both of
time and money, even if he ultimately succeeds. Hence .it hasbeen often held that a title is not marketable where it exposes
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the party holding it to litigation." Swayne vs. Lynn, 67 Pa. 486;
Stone vs. Carter, 48 Sup. 236.
The title may be doubtful, even when not made so by the
doubtfulness of facts. The interpretation of a will which will
finally win the adhesion of the ultimate court, may be unpredictable with any serious confidence. A title depending thereon will be
unmarkatable, until such ultimate court has spoken. Nor is its
having spoken enough, unless it has spoken in a case in which
the claimants under possible rival interpretations have
'been
parties, so that they will be bound by the adjudication. 48 Sup.
236.
A decision, in a suit for the purchase money, that the
title is good, would not bind a rival claimant, who was not a
party, and who could still contest the vendee's right to the
land.
Were this an action by the vendor, Simpson, for the purchase money, the vendee could defeat it, by exposing the unmarketableness of his title. le could rescind. He has rescinded
in this case, and he is therefore entitled to recover what he has
paid. Svolovitz vs. Margulis, 35 Sup. 252. Stone vs Carter, 48
Sup. 236. If there is a right to rescind, and there is a recission,
it is the duty, moral and legal of the vendor to return the money
he has received, and performance of this duty can be enforced
by the action of assumpsit.
The judgment must be affrmed.
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BOOK REVIEW
-Cases on Rights in Land, by Harry A. Bigelow, Professor
of Law in the University of Chicago. The West Publishing Company; 1919.
This is the second of five volumes of cases on Property. The
first deals with Personal Property, the third with Titles to Real
Property, the fourth with Future Interests and the fifth with
Wills, Descent and Administration. An extremely valuable feature of the book is an introduction to the Law of Real Property,
in 88 pages. It embraces chapters on the Feudel System, on Estates, Non-Possessory Interests in Land, on Joint Ownership, on
Disseisin and on Uses and Trusts. The careful study of these
chapters would be a very suitable Sntroduction to that of the
cases following. The cases are marshalled under these classes.
Rights incidental to possession, rights on the land of another,
-equitable enforcement of agreements running with the land,
Legal enforcement of covenants running with .the land, Rents,
Waste, Public Rights. They cover 730 pages. The cases are selected from the English decisions, and from perhaps those of
every state of the Union. An examination justifies the statement -that they are of extreme interest, touching on important
principles and enounced by the most authorative judges.
Bigelow's Cases is a notable addition to the facilities for the
study of law liberally supplied for many years by the colossal
law publishing corporation of St. Paul.

